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COMMENTS
LABOR LAW - EMPLOYER'S GOOD FAITH DOUBT
OF UNION'S MAJORITY
Under the National Labor Relations Act' as amended there
have developed two means by which a union may obtain recogni-
tion as exclusive bargaining representative. The first is through
the election and certification procedure of section 9(c),2 which
provides for an election by secret ballot upon the filing of a peti-
tion by an employee, a labor union, or an employer. The second
method, derived from the refusal to bargain provision of section
8 (a) (5) ,3 requires the employer to bargain "as soon as the union
representative presents convincing evidence of majority sup-
port."
4
The latter method is based on presentation of authorization
cards5 signed by a majority of the employees in the unit to be
represented. The Supreme Court in Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB 6
set forth the prevailing interpretation of the act which permits
selection of a representative in this manner. It held that a wrong-
ful refusal to bargain upon presentation of authorization cards
constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8 (a) (5)7 and
that this violation obviated the necessity of holding a section
1. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
2. 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964) : "Whenever a petition
shall have been filed in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by
the Board . . . . If the Board finds . . . that . . . a question of representation
exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results
thereof."
3. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964) : "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer . . . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees .. "
4. NLRB v. Dalstrom Metallic Door Co., 112 F.2d 756, 757 (2d Cir. 1940).
5. Authorization cards, under rulings of the Board and the courts, may be in
the form of regular union membership cards, see Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB,
185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951) ; cards showing
explicit acceptance of the union as bargaining representative, see NLRB v. Stow
Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S, 964 (1954) ; ap-
plications for union membership, see NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S.
318 (1940) ; or authorizations for the checkoff of union dues, see Lebanon Steel
Foundry v. NLRB, 130 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 659
(1942).
6. 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
7. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964).
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9(c) secret ballot election." An order requiring the employer
to bargain was declared the proper remedy under the theory
that a fair election was no longer possible. The Court cited as
authority section 10(c), which authorizes the Board "to take
such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of
this Act."9 The importance placed by the courts on section
8 (a) (5) is indicated by the post-1947 decisions which continued
to apply the Franks Bros. reasoning even though the intervening
Taft-Hartley Act' ° had extended section 9 (c) to give an employer
the right to petition for an election upon the presentation to him
of any recognition claim." I
An employer's right to a Board election under section 9(c)
is not absolute.-12  He may refuse to bargain and insist on an
election as long as he doubts in good faith that a majority of
employees have selected the union as their exclusive bargaining
representative.' If the employer's good faith doubt is ascer-
tained and a question of representation exists, an election is
conducted by the Board. It may be an ordinary certification
election 14 or a consent election as provided for in the Act. 5 But
if a lack of good faith is shown, the Board will issue a bargain-
ing order under the presumption that an election free from un-
due influence is no longer possible and that the authorization
cards should be accepted as the best available evidence of the
employees' wishes at the time of employer refusal to bargain.
A union can now seek a bargaining order even after having
lost a certification election under the policy-making decision of
Bernel Foam Products Co.' That case overruled the standard
8. When an employer has violated the act by a refusal to bargain with the
union, the Board requires tlat the employer "bargain exclusively with the par-
ticular union which represented a majority of the employees at the time of the
wrongful refusal to bargain despite that union's subsequent failure to retain its
majority." Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705 (1944).
9. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
10. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1964).
11. Before the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act an employer could file a representation
petition only when there were conflicting claims of two or more unions. This
change permits him to file a petition when only one union claims majority status.
12. United Mine Workers of America v. Arkansas Oak Flooring, 351 U.S. 62,
74-75 (1956) ; NLRB v. Elliot-Williams Co., 345 1'.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. Trimfit of California, 211 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Aaron
Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (1966).
13. Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (1966).
14. Dixie Cup, 157 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (1966). Gafner Automotive & Machine,
Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 577 (1966) ; Western Saw Mfgs., 155 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1965).
15. Labor Management Relations Act § 9(c) (4), 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 159(c) (4) (1964); Marvin v. Whitbeck, 155 N.L.R.B. 40 (1965);
J. M. Machinery Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 860 (1965).
16. 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964).
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of Louis Aiello,"7 which held that a union must select either an
NLRB-conducted election or an unfair labor practice charge of
refusal to bargain in order to be recognized as employee repre-
sentative - but not both. Bernel reinstates the pre-Aiello policy
in holding that a union does not waive one means of proving its
majority by electing to pursue another. In permitting unions to
bring refusal-to-recognize charges after losing an election, the
Board encourages them to proceed to elections and denies the
employer any benefit from the delay involved in prosecuting an
unfair labor practice charge.' Kolpin Bros. Co.19 drew the neces-
sary boundary to this policy, limiting valid subsequent refusal-
to-bargain charges to cases where an election has been set aside
on the basis of meritorious objections, thus wisely eliminating
cases where there was no interference with the election from
application of the Bernel Foam rule.
To sustain a refusal to bargain charge and secure a bargaifi-
ing order the General Counsel of the Board must prove the
existence of four vital elements. 20 First, the union must repre-
sent a majority of employees as exclusive collective bargaining
agent at the time of the employer's alleged refusal to bargain.
This may be either the date the employer receives the request
for recognition 2 1 or the date he refuses recognition. 22 Second,
there must be a positive request for recognition by the union,
either oral or written and either presented in person or sent by
registered letter or wire. Third, this communication must spe-
cify a unit of employees appropriate for bargaining.23 Finally,
the General Counsel must show employer bad faith.
DETERMINING GOOD OR BAD FAITH
The determination of employer good or bad faith is the cru-
cial issue when a union seeks a bargaining order based on au-
thorization cards. One standard for judgiig good or bad faith
17. 110 N.L.R.B. 1365 (1954).
18. The cxtensive hearings and litigation required would serve as a bonus in
time of possibly several years, costing a wilfully anti-union employer little com-
pared to the increased wages and benefits that unionization might produce.
19. 149 N.L.R.B. 1378 (1904).
20. Orlove, An Employer's Obligation to Recognize a Union Absent an NLRB
Election, 47 CHi. B. RECORD 107, 108 (1965).
21. Allegheny Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 388 (1961), enf'd, 312
F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1962).
22. Burton-Dixie Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 880 (1953), enf'd, 210 F.2d 199 (10th
Cir. 1954).
23. See Ash Market & Gasoline, 130 N.L.R.B. 641 (1961).
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was established in the leading case of Joy Silk Mills, Inc. v.
NLRB24 and has subsequently been followed in every circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, enforcing
a bargaining order, held that
"an employer may refuse recognition to a union when mo-
tivated by a good faith doubt as to that union's majority
status .... When, however, such refusal is due to a desire
to gain time and to take action to dissipate the union's ma-
jority, the refusal is no longer justifiable and constitutes a
violation of the duty to bargain set forth in section 8(a) (5)
of the Act."
'25
The Board decision in Joy Silk confirmed its policy explicitly as
establishing a lack of good faith where the employer's insistence
on an election is motivated "by a rejection of the collective bar-
gaining principle or by a desire to gain time within which to
undermine the union.' 26 In setting forth the relevant factors
the Board held that good or bad faith of the employer at the
time of refusal must be determined "in the light of all relevant
facts in the case, including any unlawful conduct of the employer,
the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal
and the unlawful conduct. ' 27 The General Counsel had the burden
of proving a lack of good faith doubt.
"Where the General counsel seeks to establish a violation of
Section 8(a) (5) on the basis of a card showing, he has the
burden of proving not only that a majority of employees in
the appropriate unit signed cards designating the union as
bargaining representative, but also that the employer in bad
faith declined to recognize and bargain with the union.
'28
The General Counsel must show affirmative proof of bad faith,
although recent decisions require the employer to justify his
refusal to bargain once he or a neutral party has counted the
cards, placing on him a heavy duty amounting almost to the
24. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enf'd, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. de-
nied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
25. 185 F.2d 732, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
26. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949), quoting Matter of Artcraft Hosiery Co.,
78 N.L.R.B. 333 (1948).
27. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949).
28. John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 99, 100-01 (1965). But where there
is a prior certification or contract there is a rebuttable presumption that the
union still maintains a majority status, laying the burden of proof on the employer.
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effective burden of proof.29 As a good faith doubt is presumed
until the asserted bad faith doubt is proven, a survey of the
cases is necessary to find where the employer has been held lack-
ing good faith.
Board policy focuses primary attention on the employer's
motivation at the time of his initial refusal, but two separate
guidelines have developed for its determination. Lack of good
faith can be established by the employer's conduct at the time
of his refusal 0 or by subsequent conduct31 tending to dissipate
the union's strength which establishes a conclusive presumption
that the employer's doubt was not in good faith.3 2 This latter
-area marks the most frequent use of the Joy Silk test and is best
identified by the employer's commission of other unfair prac-
tices. Under this analysis the cases fall into two general cate-
gories: (1) those involving other unfair labor practices (usually
occurring after the refusal to bargain with bad faith presumed
where there was an attempt to dissipate the union's majority)
and (2) those void of any other unfair labor practices (the
significant conduct coming at the time of refusal with a viola-
tion grounded on a rejection of the collective bargaining prin-
ciple).
First, committing other unfair labor practices either in an
effort to reduce the union's alleged majority or in compaigning
for a union defeat before an election almost invariably gives rise
to the presumption that the employer's insistence on an election
lacked good faith.3 3 These unfair labor practices frequently take
the form of threats, 34 interrogation concerning union activity,8 5
29. See Shuman, Requiring a Union To Demonstrate its Majority Status by
Means of an Election Becomes Riskier, 16 LABOR L.J. 426, 430 (1965).
30. See William S. Shurett d/b/a Greyhound Terminal, 137 N.L.R.B. 87
(1962), enf'd, 314 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1963).
31. Occasionally cases arise where the conduct took place prior to the bargain-
ing demand, but these are infrequent and require a showing that the employer
was aware of the card drive. See Witbeck, d/b/a Witbeck's IGA Supermarket,
155 N.L.R.B. 40 (1965); Warren Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 689 (1950) ; Lancaster
Garment Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 935 (1948).
32. See, e.g., International Union of Electrical Radio & Machine Workers v.
NLRB, 352 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ; Daylight Grocery Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 733,
742 (1964), enf'd, per curiam, 345 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1965); S.N.C. Mfg. Co.,
147 N.L.R.B. 809, 810 (1964).
33. Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (1966) ; see, e.g., Colson Corp.,
148 N.L.R.B. 827, 829 (1964), enf'd, 347 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 904 (1965) ; NLRB v. Elliott-Williams Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 811 (1963),
enj'd, 345 F.2d 460, 464 (7th Cir. 1965).
34. See, e.g., Better Val-U Stores, 161 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1966) ; Sonora Sundry
Sales, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (1966) ; Southwestern Transp. Co., 154 N.L.R.B.
374 (1965) ; Donald Skillings, 152 N.L.R.B. 1018 (1965).
35. See, e.g., Consolidated Rendering Co., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (1966) ; Copeland
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promises or grants of benefits, 36 surveillance,37 and discrimina-
tory discharges.38 In Bauer Welding & Metal Fabricators, Inc.,39
employer encouragement of company unions was sufficient to
overrule an assertion of good faith. Even polling to test the
validity of the union card count has been found an unfair labor
practice imputing bad faith.
40
The Board, supported by the courts, has held that these vio-
lations indicate an attitude of bad faith at the time of the
original refusal to bargain and prevent the possibility of an im-
partial election so that the fairest solution is a bargaining order
based on the authority of the signed cards. Thus, as a general
rule, the employer's refusal to recognize a union in conjunction
with other unfair labor practices will stand as proof of a lack
of good faith and a violation of section 8(a) (5).4 1 However, not
all violations of the act support a refusal-to-bargain finding.
The nature and gravity of the unfair labor practice must be ex-
amined to determine if they are "of such a character as to reflect
a purpose to evade an obligation to bargain." 42 This is adhering
to the Board policy set forth in 1965 in Hammond & Irving,
Inc.43 where an employer's good faith doubt was upheld though,
after refusing to bargain, he unlawfully interrogated 6 out of
110 employees. The Board held:
"[N]ot every act of misconduct necessarily vitiates the re-
spondent's good faith . . . For there are some situations in
which the violations of the Act are not truly inconsistent with
a good-faith doubt that the union represents a majority of
Oil Co., 157 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (1966) ; Dixie Color Printing Corp., 156 N.L.R.B.
1431 (1966) ; Clark Printing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 121 (1964) ; Mid-West Towel &
Linen Serv., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 744 (1963), enf'd, 339 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1964).
36. See, e.g., Wickland Oil Co., 161 N.L.R.B No. 39 (1966) ; Tucson Ramada
Caterers, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 571 (1965); Mantzowitz Mfg. Corp., 153 N.L.R.B.
1517 (1965); Lively Serv. Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 290 (1960). However, in Leeds
Shoe Stores, 117 N.L.R.B. 585 (1957), a grant of shorter hours just prior to a
union's claim of majority status was found to be a coincidence, thus not impairing
the employer's good faith.
37. See, e.g., Baldwin Supply Co., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1966) ; Piggly Wiggly
El Dorado Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 445 (1965); Comfort, Inc., 152 N.L.R.B. 1074
(1965) ; Smeco Indus. Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1965).
38. See, e.g., Post Houses, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (1966); River Togs,
160 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1965) ; Shoppers Fair, 151 N.L.R.B. 1604 (1965) ; Merner
Lumber & Hardware Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1024 (1964).
39. 154 N.L.R.B. 954 (1965), violation of § 8(a) (2).
40. NLRB v. Mid-West Towel & Linen Serv., Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 744 (1963),
enf d, 339 F.2d 958 (7th Cir. 1964).
41. See Orlove, An Enployer's Obligation To Recognize a Union Absent an
NLRB Election, 47 CHI. B. RECORD 107, 110 (1965).
42. Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (1966).
43. 154 N.L.R.B. 1071 (1965).
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the employees. Whether the conduct involved reflects on the
good faith of the employer requires an evaluation of each
case."44
Other recent cases 45 have borne out this approach, and the Board
seems to have rejected the earlier per se application of the Joy
Silk test,40 now looking to the nature and extent of the unfair
labor practices to determine if they were committed to delay
the holding of a fair election and to allow time to dissipate the
union's majority, as a manifestation of the employer's bad
faith.47
A second broad category concerning an employer's doubt of
a union's majority status is composed of cases with no unfair
labor practices present other than the alleged refusal to bargain.
In this line of cases the issue of good or bad faith doubt is usually
judged by employer action at the time of card presentation. In
George Groh & Sons,48 the trial examiner set forth the prevailing
attitude, which was approved by the Board and the court:
"An analysis of the cases wherein the Board has made this
good-or-bad faith determination 'suggests rather strongly
the pervading importance' of contemporaneous unlawful con-
duct as a cardinal criteria. However, it does not perforce
follow that a finding of such unlawful conduct is the sine
qua non to a rejection of a good faith defense. While accom-
panying unlawful conduct may render more discernible an
unlawful motive, its absence is but a factor,' and not a pre-
clusive one, to be weighed in a 'discriminating analysis and
appraisal of all the relevant evidence.' The absence of good
44. Id. at 1073.
45. Clermont's, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. 1397 (1965). Coercive speeches, apparently
in reaction to first hearing of union activity, were made two months prior to the
union's request for recognition and never repeated. This, along with two isolated
incidents of coercive statements and surveillance 'by minor supervisors with respect
to two employees, failed to indicate bad faith in refusing to bargain. Cameo
Lingerie, 148 N.L.R.B. 535 (1964), while ultimate decision here rested on lack
of a majority by the union, the court stated that the § 8(a) (1) violation, con-
sisting of threats by a minor supervisor to a handful of employees out of a unit
of 250 employees, standing alone was not sufficient evidence on which to base a
refusal to bargain charge.
46. For many years the Joy Silk test operated to make any unfair labor prac-
tice per se a showing of a lack of good faith doubt of majority status. See Com-
ment, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 814 (1966). For significant exceptions to the early per se
approach, see Caldwell Packaging Co., 125 N.L.R.B. 495 (1959) ; Traders Oil Co.
of Houston, 119 N.L.R.B. 746 (1957) ; Howard W. Davis, d/b/a The Walmac
Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 1355 (1953).
47. Orlove, An Employer's Obligation to Recognize a Union Absent an NLRB
Election, 47 Cm. B. RECORD 107, 112 (1965).
48. 141 N.L.R.B. 931 (1963), enf'd, 329 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1963).
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faith, then, may be manifested as well by attitudes and con-
duct demonstrating a rejection of the collective bargaining
concept as by more overt, readily discernible Section 8 (a) (1)
and 8(a) (3) conduct potentially more immediately destruc-
tive of the Union's majority status."4 9
A leading case is Snow & Sons5 ° wherein the employer originally
assented to and participated in a card count of the union's ma-
jority and later refused to recognize the union, insisting on an
election. The court held the employer's action to be a rejection
of the collective bargaining concept and his expressed doubt to
be in bad faith. This principle has been applied both where the
employer himself has checked the cards5' and where a third
party has checked them.52 The court in Snow & Sons went so
far as to state that reliable information from any source,
"whether by accident or design, or even while the employer is
seeking to avoid receiving it," is sufficient to destroy any genuine
doubt of majority representation." The test under which this
principle has apparently been applied requires the objective facts
to furnish a "reasonable basis" for the asserted doubt in order
to render a finding of good faith.54 Thus, "the assertion must be
supported by objective considerations." 55
Sufficient "objective considerations" were found in Briggs
IGA Foodliner,56 where several employees reported that their
signatures had been procured by union threats that those who
refused to sign could be discharged and by union officials' repre-
49. Id. at 939.
50. 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enj'd, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
51. See, e.g., William S. Shurett, d/b/a Greyhound Terminal, 137 N.L.R.B.
87 (1962), enf'd, 314 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1963) (employer insisted on election two
days after acknowledging union); Jem Mfg., Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 643 (1966)
(employer checked cards, was satisfied of the union's majority, and commenced
bargaining before asserting a doubt of majority status, after consulting a new
attorney).
52. See, e.g., Dixon Ford Shoe Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 861 (1965) (card check by
a judge followed by employer rejection of results) ; Kellogg Mills, 147 N.L.R.B.
342 (1964), enf'd, 347 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1965) (third party card check and
collective bargaining before insistence on an election). In each case the Board
ruled that the employer could not have a good faith doubt as to the union's
majority status as he had agreed to an impartial card check.
53. 308 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1962).
54. Laystrom Mfg. Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482 (1965). Proof of good faith doubt
requires more than employer's "mere assertion of it and more than proof of the
employer's subjective frame of mind." The case also cites the early case of
Celanese Corp. of America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951).
55. 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965). This has appeared to deny any effect
to a possible sincere doubt as to the reliability of the card check process itself and
has recently been limited by Aaron Brothers Co., 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (1966),
to apply only where there was employer participation in the card check.
56. 146 N.L.R.B. 443 (1964).
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sentation that the cards meant nothing until there was an elec-
tion. Similarly, in Cameo Lingerie, Inc.,57 objective grounds for
employer doubt existed as the authorization cards were misdated
and numerous employees had told the plant superintendent that
they did not wish to be represented by the union though they
had signed cards. Other grounds for good faith doubt were
present in Neuman Transit Co.,58 where it was uncertain what
class of workers constituted the asserted bargaining unit and
where, during an ensuing strike, a majority of employees re-
mained at their jobs. And in Poe Machine & Engineering Co.,59
a good faith doubt was found where there was knowledge that
some employees were interested in a rival union, though it had
not made a request for recognition.
Recently in John P. Serpa, Inc.6 0 the Board seems to have
taken a significant step contrary to the usual policy of strict
adherence to card checks in the absence of other objective con-
siderations. Five of seven salesmen signed authorization cards
which union representatives spread in front of the employer
at a meeting called for discussing representation. The employer
asked for time to consult his attorney and the union representa-
tives agreed. He consulted his attorney but did not call the union,
and four days later the union filed refusal to bargain charges.
The Board refused to find employer bad faith, stating:
"The fact that the Union placed the cards in front of the
Respondent in such a way that Respondent saw the names
and signatures cannot create the obligation to bargain or
establish Respondent's bad faith."'"
The Board stated that the General Counsel had not met his
burden of proving that "the employer in bad faith declined to
recognize and bargain with the union" -that he has rejected
the collective bargaining principle or seeks to gain time within
which to undermine the union and dissipate its majority.62 The
case is distinguished from Snow & Sons,68 where the employer
agreed to a third-party card check and thereafter rejected the
57. 148 N.L.R.B. 535 (1964).
58. 138 N.L.R.B. 659 (1962).
59. 107 N.L.R.B. 1372 (1954).
60. 155 N.L.R.B. 99 (1965).
61. Id. at 101.
62. Ibid.
63. 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961).
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results and sought a Board election. Here the General Counsel
presented no indication that the employer examined the cards
or made any statement accepting the fact of union majority.
Further, the employer did not begin bargaining with the union,
as was done in the Jem Mfg. case.
0 4
Similarly, in Aaron Bros. Co.65 the union obtained a majority
of authorization card signatures and requested recognition and
bargaining. The employer rejected the request and urged a Board
election. As the employer "did not engage in any contemporane-
ous misconduct and the General Counsel did not introduce other
affirmative evidence from which an inference of bad faith might
be drawn," the Board ruled that the General Counsel had failed
to establish improper motivation in the employer's insistence
upon an election. With these decisions the Board appears to be
limiting employer conduct for which it will find existence of a
bad faith doubt. 6 Under this recent 8(a) (5) policy limitation
an employer "who in good faith withholds recognition because
of a doubt of majority, though his doubt is founded on no more
than a distrust of cards, may have an election to resolve that
doubt, and will not be subject to an 8(a) (5) violation simply
because he is unable to substantiate a reasonable basis for his
doubt." 6 This may even be an indication that the Board is
getting away from the motivation concept in favor of looking to
more objective means of determining good or bad faith.
CONCLUSION
The cases analyzed seem to indicate that the Board and the
courts have applied .the refusal to bargain provision to its fullest
extent. The concept is meritorious in that it allows designation
of a bargaining representative based on authorization cards in
situations where a free election is impossible, and it denies an
employer any benefit from unlawful interference. The Board
in recent cases has begun to limit the application of section
8(a) (5), taking a realistic approach in view of the deficiency
of authorization cards as indicators of employee choice. 68 Gen-
164. 156 N.L.R.B. 643 (1966).
65. 158 N.L.R.B. No. 108 (1966).
66. See Orlove, An Employer's Obligation To Recognize a Union Absent an
NLRB Election, 47 CHn. B. RECORD 107, 112 .(1965).
67. H & W Constr. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. No. 77, at 7 (1966).
,68. In an often-quoted address Board Chairman McCulloch stated: "In 58
elections, the unions presented authorization cards from 30 to 50% of the em-
ployees; and they won 11 or 19% of them. In 87 elections, the unions presented
19671
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erally the card check process has two significant shortcomings
when compared to NLRB election and certification procedures. 69
First, lack of secrecy permits subtle coercion to influence an
employee's vote, including dual purpose cards, friendship influ-
ences, and union pressure. In conjunction with this is the di-
minished reflection by employees due to the informal atmosphere.
The second major shortcoming is that employees are often de-
prived of the employer's viewpoint when he has no knowledge
of the campaign until he is presented with a demand for im-
mediate recognition.
The Board under present policy recognizes that there is a
valid good faith element inherent in an expressed doubt due to
the inadequacies of the card check process. No longer is any
other objective consideration necessary to show good faith and
thus overcome any possible bad faith derived from union asser-
tion of a card majority. But this is limited to instances where
the employer has refused a card count.
In order to insure employees of representation by a union of
the choice of the majority, this policy might well be extended
to include other situations where there has been no destruction
of the possibility of a fair election. The Board has been under-
standably reluctant to require an election in cases where the em-
ployer has counted the cards or assented to a third party card
count in view of the general policy of permitting an employer to
recognize a majority union voluntarily. Another important con-
sideration involves the administrative problems that would arise,
for it would then become necessary to determine how long a
period would be allowed for the employer to reject the card check
and request an election. Union bargaining stability requires
either recognition 70 or certification 7' at some point beyond which
an employer will not be allowed to assert a valid doubt of the
union's majority.
But it appears that the importance of ascertaining the true
authorization cards from 50 to 70% of the employees; and they won 42 to 52%
[sic-42 or 48%] of them. In 57 elections, the union presented authorization
cards from over 70% of the employees, and they won 43 or 74% of them." 1962
PROCEEDINGS, SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
14-17.
69. See Comment, 33 U. CII. L. REv. 387, 390 (1966).
70. An employer is required to bargain with 'a "recognized" union for a rea-
sonable period of time. See Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702 (1944).
71. If a union has been certified through an NLRB election, the employer
must bargain with it for one year after the date of certification. Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96 (1954).
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majority choice of the employees should override the considera-
tion of union stability in the initial bargaining period and re-
quire an extension of 9(c) elections with reduction of 8(a) (5)
bargaining orders.
The Board might adopt the policy of upholding a refusal to
bargain charge in absence of other unfair labor practices only
when the employer asserts a doubt as to the union's majority
after commencing substantive bargaining. Once an employer
begins to bargain collectively over wages, hours, or other terms
and conditions of employment, he has effectively accepted the
union as representative of his employees and should not there-
after be entitled to asert a doubt as to the legitimacy of this
representation. Prior to commencement of bargaining an em-
ployer's section 9(c) right to an election 72 should be maintained
unless he destroys its fairness. This protects the innocent em-
ployer who counts the cards but still doubts the union's actual
majority status.
This method would be a valid application of the "good faith
doubt" test as it allows an effective assertion of doubt (which
is inherent in the card check process) up to the point where the
employer begins literal bargaining, and thus presumably has no
doubt that his employees have chosen the particular union, or has
abandoned any desire of further proof of that fact. As the Trial
Examiner in Mutual Industries, Inc. stated: "It is inconceivable
that [Respondent] would discuss the Union's bargaining de-
mands . . . if Respondent entertained any good faith doubt as
to the Union's majority. ' 73 The Board in Atlanta Journal Co.
had earlier stated: "Our experience shows, and it is common
knowledge, that where an employer sincerely doubts the majority
status of a union that is claiming such status, the employer will
normally refuse to bargain with the union until the status is
proved."
74
A subjective determination of employer good faith would not
be required, eliminating this difficult and often inappropriate
72. The Taft-Hartley revision of § 9(c) sets forth the employer's right to an
election explicitly. An employer has only to file a petition and show that a ques-
tion of representation exists and that a claim for recognition has been made by a
labor union. See Lassman, Employer Petitions for NLRB Elections and the
Board's Disclaimer Doctrine, 17 LAB. L.J. 341, 343 (1966). But courts often cite
cases that were decided 'before the Taft-Hartley changes or cases that in turn cite
pre-1947 rulings. See Comment, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 820 (1966).
73. 159 N.L.R.B. No. 73, at 9 (1966).
74. 82 N.L.R.B. 832, 835 (1949).
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means of deciding whether a card count or an election will be
used to reveal the employees' choice. This would also bring into
clearer focus the meaning of the refusal to bargain charge itself
in this area as the employer, after commencing collective bar-
gaining, has literally refused to continue. This policy would
protect the union's desire for stability when it is most essential-
during the actual bargaining process-and give greater weight
to the desirability of an accurate determination of employee
choice before this time. The union still has the right to file for
an NLRB election to counteract any delay in bargaining by the
employer.7 5 Under present procedure a union is able to secure
a certification election within ten to seventy days after filing
a petition,7 causing a minimum of delay. The proposed policy
looks to determining employee choice in the most effective man-
ner, placing priority on section 9(c) elections with section
8(a) (5) bargaining orders operative in the exceptional cases
where the employer has destroyed the possibility of a fair elec-
tion or has accepted the union and begun to bargain before
asserting a doubt of its majority.
L. Edwin Greer
THE AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE DOCTRINE IN
LOUISIANA MINERAL LAW
If A acquires ownership of property he previously sold while
not the owner to B, his after-acquired title inures to B. This
Comment explores the operation of this after-acquired title doc-
trine generally and, in Louisiana mineral rights.
PART I. FOUNDATION AND GENERAL APPLICATION
A. Foundation
Without express code authority, Louisiana courts have re-
peatedly asserted that the after-acquired title doctrine is a means
75. The union could file at the time of card presentation. Then if the employer
commits unfair labor practices, destroying 'a free election, refusal to bargain
chargds could be filed. Under Bernel Foam, 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964), the union
could utilize both methods.
76. Local Regional Directors are now permitted to decide representation ques-
tions and to direct elections, thus allowing speedy determination of questions
which formerly had to be channeled to Washington. Shuman, Requiring a Union
To Demonstrate its Majority Status by Means of an Election Becomes Riskier,
16 LAD. L.J. 426, 428 (1965).
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